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Editorial  
On 4 November 2016, the Paris Agreement (PA) entered into force less than eleven months after its 
adoption in December 2015. The record speed with which countries ratified the agreement and met the 
double threshold of 55 Parties and 55% of global emissions is largely unprecedented in international 
policy in recent years. The approach of the PA, including its treatment of Nationally Determined 
Contributions (NDCs) and cooperative approaches among Parties under Article 6, is one that is 
fundamentally decentralised in nature. Its provisions set out parameters within which countries are to 
take climate action and ratchet up ambition over time, but are neither prescriptive of the actions those 
countries are to undertake nor the particular approaches to cooperation.  
In relation to carbon markets, future guidance to be adopted by the Parties to the Agreement will have 
to consider the nexus of NDCs, accounting and the various mechanisms for implementing the voluntary 
cooperation that countries will engage in. It will need to cover in particular the avoidance of double 
counting, additionality issues of Art. 6 mechanisms and other issues that could jeopardise 
environmental integrity in the generation and transfer of mitigation outcomes, as well as ensuring 
transparency, good governance and the necessary institutional infrastructure. It will also need to 
consider the key role that carbon markets can have in enabling and encouraging greater mitigation 
ambition and in bringing about sectoral transformation. In particular the question of how overall ambition 
of the PA can be increased over time will become an increasingly important and contradictory topic.  
 
This study aims at making a step toward a better understanding of the above mentioned issues covered 
by Art. 6. as well as an enhanced usage of its scope. It is supported by a grant from the Federal Ministry 
for the Environment, Nature Conservation and Nuclear Safety (BMU). The analysis, results and 
recommendations in this paper represent the opinion of the authors and are not necessarily 
representative of the position of the BMU  
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Executive Summary 
Under the current international climate policy regime, market mechanisms are to play a key role in helping 
countries to achieve their Nationally Determined Contributions (NDCs) and to support an increase of 
mitigation ambition over time. The principle of additionality in this context is crucial, as it requires that emission 
credits are only granted for mitigation activities that are not undertaken in a business-as-usual (BAU) situation. 
Additionality determination has been highly contested in the context of the Kyoto Mechanisms, especially 
under the CDM where selling countries did not have any emission targets. Under the Paris Agreement (PA), 
all countries have defined NDCs. At first glance, this seems to solve the additionality problem under 
international carbon market mechanisms, as any sale of a non-additional emission reduction credit means 
that a country would have to “make up” for this sale through emission reductions equivalent to the non-
additional credits sold in order to reach its NDC. However, this argument no longer holds in the case the NDC 
target is less stringent than the BAU development of national emissions, with the NDC then creating “hot air”. 
In that context, additionality testing is necessary.  
A topic often confused with additionality and even using the same terminology in the COP 25 negotiation text 
is the issue which mitigation outcomes can be considered as “complementary” to or “going beyond” seller 
countries’ own NDC commitments. This is important for countries wanting to be sure that they comply with 
their NDCs. Considering the PA’s long-term target to reach net zero emissions, an even more stringent 
approach would be required where only those policy interventions are deemed additional that achieve an 
emissions reduction beyond a net-zero target compatible national emissions path, far below BAU. The 
negotiations on the Article 6 ruleset will therefore have to address three different concepts linked to the quality 
of the mitigation outcome to be transacted that should not be confounded:  
1) The assurance that the mitigation outcome respects the principle of additionality. 
2) The assurance that the transfer does not jeopardize NDC achievement of the host country 
3) The assurance that the mitigation intervention goes beyond the emissions reduction required to be in line 
with the long-term PA target 
The cooperative approaches under Article 6.2 and the Article 6.4 mechanism address the principle of 
additionality in a different manner. While it is included only implicitly as an objective under Article 6.2, it is 
formally defined as a criterion for Article 6.4. Given that the level of international oversight for Article 6.2 is 
likely to be rather limited, additionality requirements can only be brought into the reporting requirements and 
the international review process. Thus, negotiators should strive to achieve full transparency of the type of 
additionality determination undertaken, and task international reviewers under the technical expert review 
(TER) to identify non-additional transactions. This would allow buying countries to avoid acquisition of non-
additional credits but cannot prevent “rogue” transactions between governments that do not care about 
international criticism. Seller countries can “signal” strong additionality by voluntarily applying stringent 
additionality testing. 
Under Article 6.4, the Supervisory Body can define additionality tests. For projects and programmes, the 
investment test refined through many years of use under the CDM can be applied directly. For policy 
instruments and sectoral level activities, first the ambition of the NDC needs to be checked, preferably by the 
Supervisory Body. If the NDC target is more stringent than BAU, in the short term no dedicated policy 
additionality test would be required. In the long term, the additionality test could only be skipped if the policy 
achieves an emission reduction beyond a net zero compatible emissions path. Additionality testing of policies  
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would have to be differentiated according to policy instrument types and operate using payback periods for 
regulatory instruments, minimum carbon price thresholds for carbon pricing policies, and a proof of absence 
of overallocation for emissions trading systems.   
Additionality in Article 6 
Options for negotiations and cooperating Parties 
Perspectives Climate Group GmbH   www.perspectives.cc  info@perspectives.cc    Page 6 
Contents 
1.The importance of ensuring additionality for environmental 
integrity of international market mechanisms ........................ 8 
1.1. A short history of rules for additionality determination in the 
international climate policy regime ......................................................... 9 
1.2. Defining additionality in the context of the Paris Agreement................. 10 
1.3. Negotiations on additionality under Article 6 of the Paris Agreement 
and reflections in the current texts ........................................................ 12 
1.4. Scope and objectives of the analysis ............................................... 13 
2. Additionality in cooperative approaches (Art. 6.2) ........... 14 
2.1. Degree of international oversight .................................................. 14 
2.2. Options to secure international oversight on additionality .................... 15 
2.3. Options for cooperating Parties to secure additionality of action in a 
situation of lacking international oversight ............................................... 17 
2.4. The “black zone” – if cooperating Parties do not care about 
additionality ..................................................................................... 18 
3. Additionality under the Article 6.4 mechanism ............... 19 
3.1. Options to determine additionality of Article 6.4 activities ................... 19 
3.2. Options to standardize additionality testing ...................................... 21 
3.3. Supervisory Body and host country responsibilities ............................. 22 
4. Outlook for international discussion on additionality ........ 25 
References ................................................................. 26 
Annex A: Options for the negotiation text ........................... 28 
A.1 Guidance on cooperative approaches (Article 6.2) ................................. 28 
A.2 Rules, modalities and procedures for the Article 6.4 mechanism ............... 33 
Annex B: Elements for an international work programme on 
additionality 2020-2021 ................................................. 37 
  
Additionality in Article 6 
Options for negotiations and cooperating Parties 
Perspectives Climate Group GmbH   www.perspectives.cc  info@perspectives.cc    Page 7 
 
Figures 
Figure 1: Quality criteria for mitigation activities under Article 6 ........................................................... 12 
Figure 2: Reporting, reviewing and tracking of information on additionality .......................................... 16 
Figure 3: Possible baselines to assess whether a sectoral activity needs a separate additionality 
determination .................................................................................................................................. 21 
Figure 4: Centralized vs. decentralized governance approaches for the A6.4mechanism ................... 23 
Boxes 
Box 1: Anchoring additionality provisions in the guidance on Article 6.2 .............................................. 18 
Box 2: Options to ensure additionality of Article 6.4 activities ............................................................... 24 
Abbreviations 
A6.4ER Article 6.4 Emission Reduction 
A6TER Article 6 Technical Expert Review 
AIE Accredited Independent Entity 
BAT Best available technology 
BAU Business-as-usual 
CDM Clean Development Mechanism 
CDM EB CDM Executive Board 
COP Conference of the Parties 
DNA Designated National Authority 
DOE Designated Operational Entity 
ETS Emission trading scheme 
ITMO Internationally transferred mitigation outcome 
JI Joint Implementation 
KP Kyoto Protocol 
LDC Least Developed Country 
LEDs Long-term low emissions development strategy 
NDC Nationally Determined Contribution 
PA Paris Agreement 
SB Meeting of the subsidiary bodies of the UNFCCC 
SBSTA Subsidiary Body for Scientific and Technological Advice 
SIDS Small Island Developing State 
UNFCCC United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change 
 
 
  
Additionality in Article 6 
Options for negotiations and cooperating Parties 
Perspectives Climate Group GmbH   www.perspectives.cc  info@perspectives.cc    Page 8 
1. The importance of ensuring additionality for environmental integrity of 
international market mechanisms 
Environmental integrity is a key requirement that applies to all approaches under Article 6 of the Paris 
Agreement (PA Art. 6.1). One key aspect of environmental integrity in the context of global market-
based approaches is to ensure that credits are additional, i.e. that activities generating the credits would 
not have happened under “business as usual” (BAU). If NDC objectives were sufficiently ambitious (i.e. 
clearly below BAU and thus not generating “hot air”) – there would be no need for additionality checking 
as the acceptance of non-additional activities would simply lead to the need to spend money to reduce 
emissions elsewhere. In such a situation, lacking additionality of specific activities would just be a waste 
of taxpayer resources and thus lead to economic inefficiency for selling countries rather than jeopardize 
environmental integrity1. However, in a current situation where many NDCs are not sufficiently 
ambitious and generate “hot air” it becomes crucial to ensure additionality (see Michaelowa et al. 2019; 
Michaelowa and Butzengeiger 2017). In principle, the concept of additionality requires that a credited 
activity would not have occurred in the absence of the revenue from the crediting of this activity. If non-
additional credits were sold and used towards the mitigation obligation of another Party, this would lead 
to an overall increase in emissions. Despite this crucial role of additionality for global market 
approaches, the concept is not defined in a universally accepted manner. While different 
understandings and approaches for determining additionality were introduced under the market 
mechanisms of the Kyoto Protocol (KP), the context for additionality determination changes with the 
bottom-up nature of the PA, (re-)raising questions for additionality determination.  
The objective of this paper is to analyze the implications of different interpretations of additionality for 
the market-mechanisms under Article 6 and options how to anchor further additionality provisions in 
the negotiation text. First, we describe the history of the additionality concept (section 1.1), followed by 
a section on the interpretation of additionality in the context of the PA (section 1.2). Based on the 
assessment of the current status of negotiations (section 1.3), the following chapters discuss options 
for anchoring additionality provisions in the guidance for cooperative approaches under Article 6.2 
(chapter 2), as well as for the Article 6.4 baseline and credit mechanism (chapter 3).  
Chapter 2 will present reflections on preserving the “bottom-up” or “country-driven” character of 
cooperative approaches while anchoring international oversight on additionality of the resulting 
mitigation outcomes (section 2.1). Options to introduce different degrees of oversight on additionality 
 
1 This was the case for JI projects in countries with a tight carbon budget under the Kyoto Protocol, such as France and Germany. 
In contrast, countries with non-binding emissions targets such as Russia and Ukraine could sell non-additional carbon credits 
without having to make up for this through reductions elsewhere. For a succinct explanation of the problem, see: Shishlov and 
Cochran (2015).  
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will be discussed first at an international level (section 2.2) and then with regard to safeguards that 
might be implemented by the cooperating Parties themselves (section 2.3).  
In chapter 3, approaches for determining the additionality of activities will be presented (section 3.1), 
before discussing options for standardization of additionality testing (section 3.2). This chapter will also 
reflect on the role of the Supervisory Body for the Article 6.4 mechanism and host country 
responsibilities (section 3.3).  
For both Article 6.2 and Article 6.4, options for including additionality provisions in the negotiation text 
are presented in Annex A. Finally, Chapter 4 gives an outlook on the upcoming negotiations on 
additionality and further work needed beyond the adoption of the rulebook which is complemented by 
a proposal for an international work programme on additionality presented in Annex B. 
1.1. A short history of rules for additionality determination in the international 
climate policy regime  
In the context of the Clean Development Mechanism (CDM) and Joint Implementation (JI), the market-
based mechanisms of the KP, the understanding of additionality between the mechanisms varied 
slightly. This was due to the different implications of non-additional credits for each mechanism, given 
that under JI only countries with emission reduction targets were trading credits, whereas under the 
CDM host countries did not have an emission reduction target and thus did not have to mobilize 
emission reductions elsewhere for the volume of credits sold.  
Under the CDM, additionality was determined on a project level and against a baseline scenario. In 
2004, the CDM Executive Board (CDM EB) approved an Additionality Tool which includes different 
kinds of additionality tests (investment, regulatory, barrier and common practice tests) as well as 
combinations of these approaches. After being criticized for the lack of a standardized reporting 
framework which led to subjective outcomes of additionality testing, the additionality tool was revised 
and refined, the activities of project developers made more transparent and the CDM EB developed 
guidance on the assessment of investment analysis (CDM EB 2008). While this led to a decrease of 
the share of non-additional projects (Michaelowa 2009), stakeholders put pressure on regulators to 
reduce subjective elements of the analysis. At the same time, due to the price crash of CDM credits, 
there were attempts to reduce the complexity of additionality testing procedures. Under these 
influences, CDM additionality guidelines were simplified and standardized by the introduction, from 
2011 onwards, of positive lists and technology diffusion rate thresholds. Furthermore, some micro-
scale projects were automatically considered additional, in order to avoid an administrative burden for 
example for Least Developed Countries (LDCs).  
Under the two tracks of JI, different rules applied for the determination of additionality: Under Track 1, 
determined by national rules and procedures of the participating countries with emission reduction 
targets, it was assumed that additionality was automatically ensured by the incentive for host countries 
to achieve emission reduction in an economically efficient way. Experience showed, however, that this 
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incentive only works when countries have stringent emission reduction targets. Countries with lenient 
targets can “launder” their exceeding emission allowances (“hot air”) by approving non-additional JI 
projects, thereby imposing risks for environmental integrity (Kollmuss et al. 2015). Under Track 2 of JI, 
additionality could be demonstrated in either accordance with the criteria of an approved CDM 
methodology, or by providing transparent and traceable information on the conservativeness of the 
assumptions. Additionality could also be demonstrated by showing that a comparable project is likely 
to result in additional emission reductions by an Accredited Independent Entity (AIE).  
1.2. Defining additionality in the context of the Paris Agreement 
As different approaches to ensure the quality of mitigation outcomes in the context of Article 6 are often 
confused, we stress the need to differentiate between  
a) the additionality of a mitigation outcome,  
b) an assessment of the relationship between a mitigation outcome and the NDC of the host country,  
c) and the compatibility of a mitigation activity with the PA target to achieve a net balance between 
emissions and sinks by the second half of the century.  
Regarding a), the additionality of a mitigation outcome, with all Parties now committing to targets in 
different forms and time frames under their Nationally Determined Contributions (NDCs), the context 
for market-based approaches changes significantly compared to the world of the Kyoto Protocol. Some 
argue that the existence of NDCs makes any form of internationally supervised additionality testing 
obsolete, as countries have an incentive to only export additional mitigation outcomes not to jeopardize 
NDC achievement. However, this is only true if one assumes a perfect world in which all countries 
strive for ambition in climate action. Provided all NDCs had an emission reduction target below a BAU 
baseline, an Article 6 activity covered by the NDC could be deemed automatically additional to 
“anything that would otherwise occur”. Not being BAU thus can be considered a first and important 
safeguard to environmental integrity. If a country would sell mitigation outcomes, it would need to 
reduce emissions elsewhere, as it was the case for JI in countries with stringent emission reduction 
targets under the KP. However, not all NDCs have such stringent baselines, thus creating a risk for 
‘hot air’ comparable to the situation under Track 1 of JI. As it is unlikely to be agreeable that the 
stringency of nationally determined mitigation pledges may be assessed by an international body, 
additionality of Article 6 activities cannot be assessed solely with regard to the NDC of the host country, 
as this could jeopardize the environmental integrity of the international carbon market. Independent 
assessment of additionality can be of benefit for seller countries in interest of safeguarding NDC 
achievement, in particular given the interest of domestic stakeholders to “game” parameters in order 
to maximise carbon revenues that could be restricted if less carbon credits could be exported to 
investing countries. Furthermore, NDCs do not cover all sectors and emission sources. Mitigation 
outcomes achieved outside of the NDC could also be deemed “additional” to host country efforts, much 
like mitigation outcomes that are achieved in the context of “conditional” NDC targets. While going 
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beyond governmental pledges, the absence of more stringent additionality testing of investment and 
other barriers would establish a perverse incentive for host countries to keep their NDC targets low in 
ambition and to limit sectoral coverage of their NDC.  
In short: we argue that the presence of NDCs does not shield the international market-based 
cooperation from the need to do additionality testing. But even if one does not take into account the 
risk of jeopardizing overall environmental integrity, independent, internationally supervised additionality 
determination will be beneficial for both exporting and acquiring Party:  
• For the exporting Party, independent assessment of additionality can provide the assurance 
that it is investing the limited available funds in an activity that supports transition beyond its 
own efforts. 
• For the acquiring Party, independent assessment of additionality can provide the assurance 
that is not running the risk of acquiring ‘hot air’ and thus is investing its (public) funds prudently. 
Stating the fact that additionality assessment must go beyond setting NDC-equivalent baselines, a 
simple continuation of CDM methodologies is also not adequate in the context of the PA. While under 
the CDM mitigation policies were not taken into account for additionality determination2, the NDCs are 
a framework for mitigation policies that cannot be ignored. This first raises the question on how to take 
these policies into account for additionality determination. Secondly, market approaches under Article 
6 will likely allow for crediting of sectoral scale activities or of newly introduced mitigation policy 
instruments. In this regard, new tools and methods for determining additionality of these upscaled 
activities will need to be developed. 
Regarding b), in order to assist Parties in achieving their NDCs and shield seller countries from the risk 
of overselling, international rules can be established to assess if a mitigation intervention and thereby 
resulting mitigation outcomes are going beyond the mitigation interventions necessary for the host 
Parties’ NDC achievement. This is often referred to as being “additional to the NDC”. However, in our 
view this creates confusion with the principle of additionality. In the following, we will use the term 
“exceeding NDC-related mitigation”. This is a quality criterion of mitigation outcomes that proves that 
the cooperation is contributing to the overall ambition of climate action. 
Regarding c), while under the CDM a BAU approach has been used for determining baseline scenarios, 
the PA includes a requirement for increasing ambition of NDCs over time with the objective to achieve 
 
2 To avoid a perverse incentive for host country governments not to implement mitigation policies in order to protect revenues 
from sales of emissions credits, the so-called “E+/E-“ rules were adopted by the CDM EB. When assessing additionality and 
establishing baselines, policies that provide a comparative advantage to more emission-intensive technologies (E+) were only 
taken into account if their adoption predated the adoption of the Kyoto Protocol in 1997. Policies that provide a comparative 
advantage to less emission-intensive technologies (E-) were only taken into account if adopted prior to the adoption of the 
Marrakech Accords in 2001. The application of this rule however created loopholes for the stringency of additionality assessment 
that the CDM EB was never able to fully resolve (for a detailed discussion, see Shishlov and Bellassen 2012, p.22f.) 
Additionality in Article 6 
Options for negotiations and cooperating Parties 
Perspectives Climate Group GmbH   www.perspectives.cc  info@perspectives.cc    Page 12 
a balance of emissions and sinks by the second half of the century. Following a stringent interpretation 
of this provision of the PA, the criterion of additionality would only be met for activities that lead to 
emission reductions beyond a reasonable and independently defined long-term trajectory towards net 
zero emissions - at least for upscaled crediting approaches at a sectoral or policy level. This could be 
done in the context of host Party long-term low emission development strategies (LEDS) -if available-. 
For example, a new policy instrument aiming at Article 6 crediting would have to be assessed whether 
it would be likely to drive emissions to a level consistent with both the LEDS and a net zero trajectory. 
Only then the policy would be deemed additional. In the absence of country specific LEDS, region- 
and/or country-specific benchmark values for emission intensity of technologies consistent with a net 
zero trajectory or implicit carbon price thresholds could be applied that would get more stringent over 
time. For a purely illustrative example, in the first half of the 2020s, a policy might be deemed additional 
if it generates a carbon price exceeding 30 USD/t CO2e while in the second half the threshold might 
increase to 50 USD.  
The three issues are illustrated below  
Figure 1: Quality criteria for mitigation activities under Article 6 
 
Source: authors 
1.3. Negotiations on additionality under Article 6 of the Paris Agreement and 
reflections in the current texts  
Additionality was negotiated as part of the “Paris Agreement Rulebook” that should have been agreed 
at COP 24 in Katowice. Ultimately, negotiations failed to reach consensus among Parties and the 
adoption of guidelines, rules, modalities and procedures was deferred to COP 25 in December 2019. 
Although additionality determination and baseline setting were not the issues that caused the failure of 
negotiations, several groups of Parties expressed concern with the wording included in the final 
negotiation texts presented by the COP 24 Presidency. In consequence, both the first text published 
by SBSTA in the first week of COP 24 negotiations and the last iteration of the text prepared by the 
Presidency were retained as basis for the finalization of negotiations. At the 50th meeting of the 
subsidiary bodies (SB 50) in June 2019, Parties progressed by identifying key issues for further 
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discussion and addressed them in informal negotiations. This resulted in the adoption of three texts, 
for each sub-article (6.2, 6.4 and 6.8, respectively) that combined the two texts and added new 
proposals and wordings.  
Additionality was raised as an issue of concern by several groups of Parties. In the negotiations on 
Article 6.4, the principle of additionality is enshrined in the PA text and therefore its operationalization 
is one of the central issues. Parties disagreed on whether to take into account mitigation policies 
beyond the NDC of the host country. While some Parties made proposals including more stringent 
provisions than stated in the consolidated text by the COP presidency, other Parties seek to define all 
activities outside of the NDC or included as conditional target as automatically additional. With regard 
to the additionality of activities under Article 6.2, additionality was not as prominently discussed. This 
is partly due to the fact that including any form of requirements on the underlying “quality” of mitigation 
activities is contested, so negotiations on including specific requirements for activities are usually held 
at a more generic level.  
The question of unambitious NDC targets was not brought up explicitly in the negotiations, however 
the risks associated herewith could be avoided if the rule was to be established that additionality 
assessment must both take into account what would otherwise occur and the NDC targets.  
In sum, many open questions relating to additionality in Article 6 are currently still wide open in the 
negotiations:  
• The necessity to include specific requirements on additionality in the guidance on cooperative 
approaches (Article 6.2) and possibilities to ensure oversight on its assessment, through the 
reporting and review process or other modalities 
• The definition of additionality in the rules, modalities and procedures for Article 6.4 
• The responsibilities of host countries for additionality assessment in the context of the Article 
6.4 mechanism 
• The determination of additionality for activities outside of the scope of countries’ NDC  
• The re-assessment of additionality methodologies and of additionality of CDM activities in the 
transition of Kyoto mechanisms towards the Paris mechanisms, in case the definition of 
additionality changes. 
1.4. Scope and objectives of the analysis 
The objective of this paper is to reflect on implications of currently discussed concepts for additionality 
in the context of the Article 6 market-based approaches to cooperation and to analyze options to further 
include the concept in the finalization of the ruleset at COP 25. Furthermore, the paper seeks to provide 
an outlook beyond COP 25 to the work programme implemented by SBSTA and Article-6-institutions 
and bodies, such as the Supervisory Body of the Article 6.4 mechanism.  
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The paper is based on previous work of the authors with regard to additionality assessment in Article 
6 (Michaelowa et al. 2019, Michaelowa and Butzengeiger 2017) and the ongoing academic debate on 
this topic (see for instance Schneider and La Hoz Theuer 2019). It expands the analysis through a 
specific link to the options currently discussed in negotiations and presented in the negotiation texts 
(SBSTA 2019a, b) and is informed by ongoing informal exchanges with negotiators, project developers 
and climate policy experts at the margins of the SB 50 in June 2019. 
2. Additionality in cooperative approaches (Art. 6.2) 
The simplest and safest way to safeguard Article 6 market-based cooperation from ‘hot air’ would be 
to exclude any country with non-ambitious NDCs from trading internationally transferred mitigation 
outcomes (ITMOs) and to refine the scope of activities to those covered by these ambitious targets. 
However, any form of international assessment of NDCs is highly unlikely to be agreeable in 
negotiations, especially where international oversight is limited as likely for cooperative approaches 
under Article 6.2. Furthermore, it would not resolve the host country risk of overselling of mitigation 
outcomes.  
The possibilities to secure international oversight on additionality determination depend on the degree 
and modalities of international oversight on cooperative approaches as a whole (section 2.1). In this 
context the paper discusses options to secure additionality through the guidance itself (section 2.2), as 
well as within the cooperation of participating Parties (section 2.3).  
2.1. Degree of international oversight 
The design of additionality assessment is linked to the degree of international oversight. In this regard, 
cooperative approaches under Article 6.2, for which oversight is delegated to the participating Parties, 
differ substantially from the internationally governed Article 6.4 mechanism. It must also be noted, 
contrarily to the Article 6.4 mechanism, that additionality is only an implicit objective of Article 6.2 
approaches contained in the requirement for environmental integrity.  
As Article 6.2 refers to bilateral and multilateral cooperation, several negotiating Party groups oppose 
an internationally established organ to exercise oversight. Other Parties pushed for an “Article 6 body” 
to safeguard the mechanism. Currently, it seems that a feasible compromise could be the enhancement 
of reporting and transparency provisions, possibly linked to some compliance measures to be taken in 
presence of “systemic issues” that affect all Parties. In this context, a reporting and review process 
complementary and intertwined with the enhanced transparency framework is currently the governance 
cornerstone of the draft text for the international guidance (see SBSTA 2019a). Furthermore, 
transparency is to be ensured through an international database on Article 6 transactions. The process 
will likely comprise the submission of initial and regular reports by Parties that are assessed by a 
Technical Expert Review (A6TER) and fed into the database by the UNFCCC Secretariat.  
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In this context, the degree of international oversight on cooperative approaches, and therefore 
potentially for additionality (if introduced as a requirement) strongly depends on:  
• The reporting requirements for both exporting and acquiring Party 
• The scope of the review mandate given to the A6TER  
• The operationalization of the international tracking infrastructure and the type of information 
that is recorded in the Article 6 database.  
The challenge consists in striking a balance between the “bottom-up” nature of cooperative 
approaches, and ensuring environmental integrity as well as avoiding an overall increase in global 
emissions that would jeopardize reaching the targets of the PA.  
2.2. Options to secure international oversight on additionality 
The concept of additionality can be anchored in different ways in the international guidance that is 
currently elaborated by the Parties to the PA. A first entry point is the definition of ITMOs as “additional”. 
This qualifier is pushed for in particular by the Alliance of Small Island States and the LDC group that 
demand that ITMOs shall be “real, measurable, verified, permanent and additional”. Such a definition 
could be interpreted to introduce a reporting requirement for Parties on their respect of this principle. 
Potentially, such a definition could also entail a review of the requirements by the A6TER and thus 
ensure that concerns regarding additionality of certain ITMOs are made public.  
Secondly, requirements on transparency on additionality of mitigation outcomes can directly be 
enshrined in the reporting and review process. Most strongly, if additionality is not explicitly included in 
the definition of ITMOs, additionality reporting can be included as a reporting requirement in the 
guidelines. The draft guidelines that serve as a basis for negotiations at COP 25 already set out the 
requirement for participating countries to report on the environmental integrity of their engagement in 
cooperative approaches, particularly on: 
“[…] the quality of mitigation outcomes, including through stringent reference levels, baselines set in a 
conservative way and below ‘business-as-usual’ emission projections (including by taking into account 
all existing policies and addressing potential leakage)” (SBSTA 2019a). 
Given the fact that additionality is a key requirement to ensure environmental integrity, this provision 
can be operationalized to also include the need to assess the additionality of the mitigation activity 
against “stringent reference levels” and taking into account existing policies. However, such an 
interpretation could only be secured if more specific wording was to be introduced. Another option 
would be to operationalize this in reporting templates, however, their use would be unlikely to be 
mandatory if it is no specific provision in the guidelines. 
A complementary option for including additionality provisions in the reporting requirements consists of 
anchoring the concept in the mandate of the A6TER. For this, the central question is whether the 
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mandate will be limited to reviewing the correctness of reported quantitative information on transfer. In 
case the A6TER would be mandated to review qualitative information on the cooperative approaches, 
this would encompass reporting on additionality of action. However, the devil would be in the detail. 
Further work would be needed to ensure the A6TER has the necessary tools and guidelines to 
effectively assess additionality in different contexts and for different types of mitigation interventions. 
In particular, for upscaled crediting approaches this could be a costly and time-consuming process. For 
linkages of emission trading schemes (ETS), however, the stringency of the emissions cap could be a 
very simple criterion of assessment of environmental integrity.  
As an A6TER review that flags concerns with additionality or other aspects of environmental integrity 
is unlikely to be linked to any form of country-specific compliance procedures, additionality of Art. 6.2 
transactions can only be enhanced at an international level through increased transparency that flags 
transfers of non-additional ITMOs and allows civil society to put pressure on the participating 
governments. While it would not be able to prevent non-additional ITMOs from ‘contaminating’ 
international carbon trading, a tagging of underlying reports and review reports to specific ITMOs in the 
international Article 6 database would allow observers to identify “black sheep” and publicly label them 
as non-additional. This is of particular relevance in the context of secondary trading of ITMOs. We 
would like to stress that a bad reputation of only a subset of ITMOs could erode the trust in the integrity 
of the whole system of international carbon markets. 
Figure 2: Reporting, reviewing and tracking of information on additionality 
 
Source: authors 
The weakest option for ensuring additionality beyond the guidance for Article 6.2 is to agree on 
voluntary guidelines on additionality assessment. For instance, Parties could mandate SBSTA and/or 
the Article 6.4 Supervisory Body to develop further guidance based on lessons learned under the Article 
6.4 mechanism and to consider these lessons in the next revision and update of the Article 6.2 
guidance, currently planned for 2024. 
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2.3. Options for cooperating Parties to secure additionality of action in a situation of 
lacking international oversight 
As explained in section 1.2, Parties cooperating under Article 6 that have ambitious domestic climate 
policies and strategies have an intrinsic motivation to ensure additionality of mitigation outcomes to be 
exported or to be acquired. In case of secondary trading on the international carbon market, such 
Parties would have an interest in transparency on the underlying mitigation interventions that lead to 
the creation of certain ITMOs. Seller countries with ambitious NDC targets have an interest in simple 
but convincing means for additionality assessment identifying action that is in line with the long-term 
target of the PA and signaling to potential buyers that their approach is stringent. Depending on the 
type of mitigation intervention, this requires carbon pricing / technology-specific emissions intensity 
benchmarks or the compatibility with net-zero emission pathways as discussed in section 1.2 above.  
For ambitious acquiring countries, a key priority in Article 6.2 transactions is to ensure the quality of 
ITMOs they are acquiring. First and foremost, governments are accountable for their spending of public 
funds. Subsidies for non-additional mitigation outcomes could easily attract heavy criticism. Past 
experiences have shown that NGOs and civil society organizations monitor international carbon 
markets and call out activities with insufficient standards. At worst, this could lead to ambitious Parties 
refraining from entering into cooperative approaches. Experience has also shown that lost trust in the 
integrity of carbon markets is difficult to restore, even if reform efforts are undertaken. While the quality 
of ITMOs can cover a broader range of aspects, such as raising ambition and social integrity, 
environmental integrity and additionality are a key feature of a ‘good quality’ ITMO. Thus, additionality 
can be strengthened by more extensive requirements of acquiring Parties when entering transfer 
agreements under Article 6.2, applying dedicated additionality tests differentiated according to the 
scale of the intervention generating the credits. Acquiring Parties can join so-called ‘buyer’s clubs’, i.e. 
associations of buyers who set more far-reaching standards for ITMOs then enshrined in the guidance 
for Article 6.2. 
In addition to safeguarding additionality, ambitious seller countries have an interest in ensuring that 
transferred ITMOs are exceeding NDC-related mitigation requirements. Depending on the type of 
mitigation intervention, this requires translating NDC –possible economy-wide- targets into sectoral or 
even project-specific baselines. However, macro-level outcomes are not easily broken down to 
intervention level effects, probably resulting in highly conservative baselines or baselines that require 
frequent updates (so-called dynamic baselines).  
Alternatively, selling countries could decide only to export ITMOs at the end of the NDC implementation 
period, when it becomes clear if the NDC can be achieved. However, this could be challenging to 
accept for the investing partner country that relies on these exports to achieve its own NDC. Possible, 
the cooperating Parties already entered transfer agreements and the investing country already 
disbursed funds for the implementation of additional mitigation outcomes. 
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Parties could decide to develop methodologies to assess the relationship between mitigation outcomes 
and NDC targets. This would then result in a two-stage process:  
1. The seller country would determine which mitigation interventions and/or the share of mitigation 
outcomes from specific interventions exceed NDC-related mitigation requirements. 
2. The set of authorized mitigation interventions would be subject to additionality assessment 
prior to the transfer of ITMOs  
2.4. The “black zone” – if cooperating Parties do not care about additionality 
Unfortunately, under the PA the emergence of rogue buyers and sellers is likely. A buyer country that 
just cares about reaching its NDC formally, but not willing to allocate sufficient resources will be happy 
to acquire non-additional ITMOs at a low price. This might be the case for large emerging economies 
with non-democratic governance systems but some interest not to be seen as completely rogue actors. 
A seller who has set an unambitious NDC target has an interest to find a buyer even if the price is low 
– given that he will get a revenue for a commodity whose creation has not cost anything.. 
The bottom-up PA system does not provide the tools to fully prevent emergence of such behavior. 
Especially under Art. 6.2, “naming and shaming” will have its limits. The million-dollar question is 
whether this “black zone” can be limited to a volume of transactions that is insignificant compared to 
the global total. Therefore, we argue it is necessary to establish references to additionality in the 
guidance on Article 6.2 in the manner discussed summarized below: 
Box 1: Anchoring additionality provisions in the guidance on Article 6.2 
Options to anchor additionality under the cooperative approaches of Article 6.2 
Key Messages 
Risks: 
• Unambitious NDC targets can lead to trading of “hot air” credits. 
• While transparency on the generation and accounting of ITMOs is a crucial precondition for 
environmental integrity, it does not guarantee additionality. 
• Absence of or rather limited international oversight facilitates transactions of non-additional 
credits, especially in the case of participating countries that do not care strongly about their 
international reputation 
Options to ensure ITMOs exceed NDC-related mitigation requirements 
• Translate NDC targets in sectoral or project-based baselines for additionality assessment 
• Export ITMOs after the NDC has been achieved, i.e. only at the end of the NDC 
implementation period.  
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Options to ensure additionality through 
international oversight 
Options for participating countries to ensure 
additionality 
• Assessment of NDCs and exclusion of 
NDCs with ”hot air”-risk from Article 6.2 
approaches. 
• Agree on a qualitative definition of 
ITMOs as “additional”. 
• Introduce wording explicitly referring to 
additionality in the reporting and review 
guidance. 
• Include additionality in the mandate of 
A6TER and develop tools and guidance 
for expert reviewers on additionality 
assessment in the context of Article 6.2. 
• Develop voluntary guidelines on 
additionality assessment beyond the 
reporting and review cycle.  
Selling countries: 
• Apply stringent additionality tests to 
project and program-based activities 
• Apply stringent carbon pricing 
thresholds for credited policy 
instruments 
• Calculate net-zero emissions compatible 
emissions paths that policy instruments 
need to be compatible with if deemed 
additional 
Acquiring countries: 
• Control quality of acquired ITMOs and 
apply specific additionality requirements 
depending on the scale of the activity. 
 
3. Additionality under the Article 6.4 mechanism 
The determination of additionality for activities under the Article 6.4 mechanism can draw on experience 
and developments from the CDM. However, the changes under the PA framework (as described in 
section 1.3) introduce new challenges for additionality determination. Options to adapt additionality 
assessment to the PA context are discussed in section 3.1. Section 3.2 addresses the pitfalls and 
benefits of standardizing additionality assessment and section 3.3 finally discusses implications of 
additionality assessment for the responsibilities of the Supervisory Body and the host countries, 
depending on different possible governance modalities for the Article 6.4 mechanism.  
3.1. Options to determine additionality of Article 6.4 activities 
The guidance on additionality of Article 6.4 activities is likely to refer to both additionality to “any 
activities that would otherwise occur” as well as the necessity that mitigation exceeds NDC-related 
mitigation requirements. Furthermore, some negotiating groups push for the consideration of all 
policies and regulations in additionality assessment, beyond those included in the NDC.  
For project- and programme-based activities under Article 6.4, additionality testing can draw on 
extensive experience from additionality testing under the CDM. These additionality tests provide 
options for determining additionality of Art. 6.4 activities: In an investment additionality test, the (project) 
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activity needs to prove that it is less profitable than a realistic alternative. In the early years of the CDM, 
also a so-called barrier test was used that assessed whether any prohibitive non-monetary barriers 
existed that prevented implementation of the activity and that would be overcome by the CDM. This 
test however suffered from perceived subjectivity how to define the prohibitive nature of the barriers 
and thus fell out of use. Thus, under Article 6.4 the investment test in its most recent form under the 
CDM should be applied. 
In contrast to project or programmatic approaches, additionality testing for the crediting of policy 
instruments or sectoral mitigation approaches is much less developed, given that the CDM did not 
allow such crediting. Michaelowa et al. (2019) provide recommendations regarding such additionality 
testing, differentiated according to the type of policy instrument. For regulatory policies such as 
efficiency standards, they suggest applying a pay-back period threshold regarding the mandated 
technology that should be around 3-5 years. For carbon pricing policies, they propose the use of a 
minimum carbon price level threshold for the policy to qualify as additional, whereas for emissions 
trading schemes an absence of over-allocation would have to be proven. They also suggest to 
differentiate such thresholds according to country categories and to increase them over time. 
When could such policy additionality assessments be skipped? Following the discussion in section 1, 
this would be possible in the short term if the NDC target is proven to be more stringent than BAU. In 
this case, it would be sufficient to ensure that mitigation exceeds the NDC targets to ensure the quality 
of A6.4ERs. The consistency with a net zero emissions path would of course not be guaranteed by 
such an approach. 
3.1.1. Baseline setting in order to prevent the “hot air” risk 
In order to address the “hot air” risk described above, ideally the Supervisory Body would check 
whether an NDC of an Art. 6.4 activity host country is ambitious. If such a check is not possible due to 
sovereignty concerns, rules on national level baseline determination are necessary. In order to prevent 
an unplanned emergence of hot air, like the one happening in the EU after the economic and financial 
crisis of 2008, dynamic sectoral or economy-wide baselines should be applied where the core 
parameters such as energy prices or GDP values that enter the calculation are updated frequently.  
These baselines could be developed according to a standardized methodology or directly by the 
Supervisory Body itself. This would limit the burden on the host countries, as these complex baseline 
constructions are resource intensive and would also ensure that the calculation of the baseline is not 
biased through politically determined parameters (for instance, overstating or understating GDP 
growth, depending on the political context). In the current negotiation text, there is the option to 
mandate the Supervisory Body to establish standardized baselines for countries at the highest level of 
aggregation possible which principally would allow the establishment of dynamic country-level 
baselines. 
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The current draft rules, modalities and procedures include the wording that Article 6.4 activities should 
be “additional” or “complementary” to the NDCs of host countries, what we here refer to as “exceeding 
NDC-related mitigation” in order to avoid confusion with the principle of additionality of the activity. This 
principle- while being an important safeguard for ambition- does not address the ‘hot air’ risk of the 
underlying NDC. 
Figure 3: Possible baselines to assess whether a sectoral activity needs a separate additionality 
determination 
 
Source: authors 
The difference between the blue dashes and the light blue line would fulfil the wording of the negotiation 
text, but still lead to “hot air” being credited unless a distinct additionality test for the specific policy 
instrument is undertaken. Such a test could be skipped in the short term if the NDC is below the light 
blue line. In the long term, only if the policy instrument manages to reduce emissions below the black 
line consistent with the long-term target of the PA the additionality test could be skipped; and the credit 
volume would be calculated as the differential between the black line and the emissions level post 
policy implementation. 
3.2. Options to standardize additionality testing 
Standardizing additionality determination can lower transaction costs and increase comparability. It 
was pursued under the CDM and is likely to continue to play a role for the implementation of the Article 
6.4 mechanism. However, standardization also brings risks, in particular if the parameters are not 
revised regularly. In the following, options for standardized additionality determination will be presented 
and discussed with regard to the risks and options for addressing them. 
Standardized activity parameters have been utilized in the CDM since COP 16. For project activities 
these standard parameters replace actual project data and thus reduce the data collection efforts for 
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additionality determination. Under the CDM two kinds of approaches exist to develop standardized 
parameters: bottom-up approaches, in which stakeholders estimate default values for parameters such 
as hurdle rates for the internal rate of return that could be applied for different projects in the same 
country or regional context. In contrast, top-down standards are developed by the UNFCCC Secretariat 
as support structure for the CDM EB that are applicable for a specific type of activity. These could be 
positive lists for activities that are automatically deemed additional. Also, the Supervisory Body could 
make use of benchmarks such as emission intensity or technology diffusion rates below which activities 
would be automatically deemed additional. These would need to be derived from some sort of 
economic modelling. Such benchmarks currently have been only used for a small subset of sectors 
and technologies, and never for policy instruments. It is probably impossible to develop globally 
applicable benchmarks that would not lead to perverse effects for certain activities in certain countries 
(Fuessler et al. 2019). Thus, the Supervisory Body should be tasked to check for which activities which 
level of aggregation of benchmarks would be appropriate. Such a dual approach to standardization 
could be retained for the Article 6.4 mechanism.  
Any form of standardization of parameters needs to be either highly conservative or adapted regularly 
(for instance every 2-3 years) to account for regional and global economic or technological shifts. For 
instance, under the CDM, some positive lists got “sticky” over time and their non-revision led to the 
crediting of non-additional renewable energy projects, after costs for the deployment of renewable 
energy had fallen substantially. 
3.3. Supervisory Body and host country responsibilities 
Up to now, there is no agreement on the role and position of the Supervisory Body in the governance 
of the Article 6.4 mechanism. There is the option to pursue the centralized governance model, in which 
the Supervisory Body – much like the CDM Executive Board - has a central role in approving activities 
under the Article 6.4 mechanism and defining additionality tests and accredits Designated Operational 
Entities (DOEs). Here, the host country would be mainly responsible to approve activities, communicate 
how these relate to the NDC and state how they promote sustainable development. Possibly, the host 
country would separately also authorize transfer of A6.4ERs outside of the country. 
Some negotiating groups and Parties prefer to give the host country a stronger role and therefore 
propose a more decentralized governance model, with less Supervisory Body responsibilities.  
Additionality in Article 6 
Options for negotiations and cooperating Parties 
Perspectives Climate Group GmbH   www.perspectives.cc  info@perspectives.cc    Page 23 
Figure 4: Centralized vs. decentralized governance approaches for the A6.4mechanism 
 
 
Source: authors 
The choice of a decentralized vs. a centralized governance model has implications for additionality 
determination. In a decentralized model, a significant responsibility for determining which activities are 
eligible under Article 6.4 and which criteria and additionality tests apply would lie with the host country. 
While such an approach would possibly strengthen host country ownership in the design of the 
mitigation activity, it will also place significant burden on the administration of the host country and lead 
to the risk of emergence of rogue players like discussed above in the context of Article 6.2. It is not 
certain whether all countries have the necessary capacities to participate in such a mechanism. 
Furthermore, there is a significant risk for gaming of tests and parameters, particularly in the absence 
of compliance safeguards.  
A centralized governance model, in which additionality rules are defined by the Supervisory Body would 
avoid these risks. However, the maintenance of the Supervisory Body is costly, in particular if this body 
is tasked with developing and regularly updating standardized additionality tests to reduce transaction 
costs for developing countries. This would require a higher administrative share of proceeds. In the 
absence of a seller’s market, meaning if prices for carbon credits remain as low as currently the case, 
this would increase the burden on project developers and raise transaction costs in particular for 
developing countries that are expected to primarily engage with the Article 6.4 mechanism. 
Ensuring a stringent additionality of credits is crucial when credits are traded on the international level. 
There is the option to reserve credits under the Article 6.4 mechanism for usage for domestic purposes. 
In this approach, countries would only register an activity under Article 6.4 and not authorize the credit 
transfer. Market participants from within the country, e.g. from the private sector could then buy these 
credits. For such domestically traded credits, additionality would not really be relevant. If countries sold 
credits designated for domestic trade internationally, e.g. if they foreseeably overachieve their NDC, 
the risk for additionality would remain. In this case a retrospective additionality determination would 
need to be ensured.  
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Box 2: Options to ensure additionality of Article 6.4 activities 
Options to anchor additionality under the mechanism under Article 6.4 
Key Messages 
Risks: 
• Unambitious NDC targets can lead to trading of “hot air” credits. 
• The negotiation text constrains regulators (Supervisory Body) in applying sufficiently 
stringent additionality tests. 
• Allocating regulatory tasks to host countries increases the risk of insufficiently stringent 
additionality tests 
• Additionality testing of activities cannot be replaced by specifying how the baseline will be 
set against the NDC, as otherwise quality of the A6.4ERs would be jeopardized  
• Approaches for standardization of additionality testing parameters such as positive lists bear 
the risk of creating loopholes for non-additional activities, especially if not updated 
frequently.  
Options to ensure A6.4ERs exceed NDC-related mitigation requirements 
Translate NDC targets into sectoral or project-based baselines for additionality assessment, while 
regularly updating the core parameters of the baseline calculation 
Options to ensure additionality through 
appropriate methodologies and baselines 
Options to ensure additionality in the 
governance of the mechanism 
For project-/programme based activities: 
• Ensure continuity of the investment test 
from the CDM.  
• Apply conservative assumptions for 
standardized investment parameters or 
update such parameters frequently.  
For activities on sectoral/policy-instrument level: 
• Develop differentiated additionality tests 
according to policy instrument. These 
tests can be skipped if the host country 
accepts that the Supervisory Board tests 
and confirms that the NDC does not 
contain “hot air” 
• Mandate the A6.4SB to establish 
dynamic baselines. 
• Maintain a centralized governance 
model for the Article 6.4 mechanism in 
order to avoid overly burdening the host 
country.  
• In a decentralized governance model, 
ensure the capacities of host countries 
to assume the responsibilities and 
introduce safeguards against the 
gaming of parameters.  
• Ensure that the additionality of activities 
designated for domestic purposes is 
assessed if they are transferred 
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o Payback period threshold test 
for regulation 
o Minimum carbon price threshold 
for carbon pricing 
o Test for absence of 
overallocation for emissions 
trading schemes 
• Develop a standardized methodology for 
additionality assessment.  
international (i.e. when the NDC target is 
overachieved).  
 
4. Outlook for international discussion on additionality 
At COP 25, the rulebook for Article 6 is expected to be adopted by the CMA. This would be crucial to 
ensure that market-based cooperation is properly safeguarded from integrity risks to contribute to the 
implementation of the PA and mobilize the private sector at scale. Additionality is unlikely to be –
ultimately- the key stumbling block of negotiations, as it is overshadowed by more contentious issues 
such as the accounting for international trade of mitigation outcomes through “corresponding 
adjustments”. However, as detailed in this paper, it is a key feature to ensure environmental integrity 
and trust of acquiring Parties in the market. Therefore, at least anchors to the concept should be 
established in both the Article 6.2 guidance for cooperative approaches and the rules, modalities and 
procedures of the Article 6.4 mechanism. In order to ensure stringency in additionality determination, 
it would be ideal to include specific additionality requirements, as well as strong governance elements 
under both. For the former, etailed rules and methodologies can then be developed through an 
international work programme and lessons learned can feed back into the international rule setting 
process under the CMA. Introducing an explicit reference to additionality in the Article 6.2 guidance 
would enable checks by the Technical Expert Review, and also provide a basis for the formation of 
“acquisition clubs” of “highly additional ITMOs”. Under Article 6.4, the supervisory body should be 
tasked with elaborating rules for the need for additionality determination on the basis of NDC ambition 
assessment. It should specify tools for additionality determination for sectoral and policy instrument-
based activities in line with the long-term target of the PA. 
Ambitious Parties can assume an important leadership role for anchoring strong additionality rules, by 
prioritizing the concept in the negotiations and assuring that the additionality concept is clearly 
separated from other elements referring to the quality of credits under Article 6 such as 
complementarity to activities under the NDC or baseline stringency. A precondition for a credible 
approach regarding additionality is that Parties engaged in Article 6 piloting apply stringent additionality 
tests. Ideally, all Article 6 pilot developers would jointly declare that they are looking only for “highly 
ambitious ITMOs” and publish joint additionality test, differentiated according to activity types.  
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Annex A: Options for the negotiation text 
A.1 Guidance on cooperative approaches (Article 6.2) 
Current wording in the draft 
negotiation text 
Language imposing guidance on 
additionality of ITMOs 
Language establishing 
international reporting/review of 
additionality 
Language safeguarding 
environmental integrity risks 
Decision text 
4. [Requests the SBSTA to undertake the 
following work, on the basis of the annex, 
to develop a draft decision on the 
[remaining] guidance on cooperative 
approaches referred to in Article 6, 
paragraph 2, for consideration and 
adoption by the CMA at its third session, 
as an integral part of the guidance:  
(e) Further elaboration of the information 
to be reported by participating Parties, as 
referred to in the annex, section VII 
(Reporting), including the agreed tabular 
format referred to in annex, section VII 
(Reporting) and the agreed electronic 
format referred to in section IX (Recording 
of corresponding adjustments); 
(f) Elaboration of guidance for the Article 6 
technical expert review; 
NA (f) Elaboration of guidance for the 
Article 6 technical expert review; 
including on the assessment of key 
principles for environmental integrity 
such as baseline setting approaches, 
additionality determination and 
avoidance of double counting 
NA 
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Current wording in the draft 
negotiation text 
Language imposing guidance on 
additionality of ITMOs 
Language establishing 
international reporting/review of 
additionality 
Language safeguarding 
environmental integrity risks 
Guidance (annex to the decision) 
1. The following definitions apply to this 
guidance: 
(a) “Internationally transferred mitigation 
outcomes (“ITMOs”)” are [to]: 
(i) [Be] [real] [verified] [additional] [and 
permanent] [and has a system to 
[ensure][address] permanence, including 
addressing reversals]{based on text from 
8 December SBSTA text, paragraph 
28(h)(iv); 
NA NA 
1. The following definitions apply to this 
guidance: 
(a) “Internationally transferred 
mitigation outcomes (“ITMOs”)” are: 
(i) Mitigation outcomes that are proven 
to be real, verified and additional  
38. For each NDC communicated or 
updated, each participating Party shall, [at 
the outset of the NDC implementation 
period][prior to or at the time of first 
transfer or acquisition of ITMOs[, including 
units from the mechanism established in 
Article 6, paragraph 4]], submit an initial 
report containing comprehensive 
information to: 
[…] 
38. For each NDC communicated or 
updated, each participating Parties 
shall, at the outset of the NDC 
implementation period, submit an initial 
report containing comprehensive 
information to:  
(x) Communicate which type of 
activities it considers to be exceeding 
mitigation required to achieve its NDC 
targets and to be additional to a 
business-as-usual scenario including 
implemented policies and regulations. 
(f) The initial report shall also include 
the information in relation to each 
cooperative approach referred to in 
paragraphs B.39, B.40, B.41 and B.42 
below, as applicable. 
Already addressed by options 
presented on the left 
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Current wording in the draft 
negotiation text 
Language imposing guidance on 
additionality of ITMOs 
Language establishing 
international reporting/review of 
additionality 
Language safeguarding 
environmental integrity risks 
(f) The initial report shall also include the 
information [[in relation to each 
cooperative approach] [that participating 
Parties intend to participate in] referred to 
in paragraphs B.39[, [B.40], B.41 [and 
B.42] below, as applicable. {Some Parties 
identified a need for refinement through 
incorporating elements from regular 
reporting} 
Parties shall provide information on the 
methodologies employed to determine 
the mitigation outcomes necessary for 
NDC achievement and to assess 
additionality of the mitigation 
outcomes. 
40. Each participating Party shall also 
submit[, as part of its biennial transparency 
reports pursuant to decision 18/CMA.1] 
the following [qualitative] information in 
relation to how the cooperative 
approaches in which it participates: 
(a) Support(s) the mitigation of 
greenhouse gas emissions and the 
implementation of its NDC; 
(b) Ensure environmental integrity, such 
that there is no increase in global 
emissions, through robust, transparent 
governance and the quality of mitigation 
outcomes, including through stringent 
reference levels, baselines set in a 
(b) Ensure environmental integrity, 
such that there is no increase in global 
emissions, through robust, transparent 
governance and the quality of 
mitigation outcomes, including through 
stringent reference levels, baselines 
set in a conservative way and below 
‘business-as-usual’ emission 
projections (including by taking into 
account all existing policies and 
addressing potential leakage) for both 
additionality determination and 
crediting of mitigation outcomes and 
ensuring the compensation of any 
material reversals; 
Already addressed by option 
presented on the left 
Already addressed by option 
presented on the left 
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Current wording in the draft 
negotiation text 
Language imposing guidance on 
additionality of ITMOs 
Language establishing 
international reporting/review of 
additionality 
Language safeguarding 
environmental integrity risks 
conservative way and below ‘business-as-
usual’ emission projections (including by 
taking into account all existing policies and 
addressing potential leakage) and 
ensuring the compensation of any material 
reversals; 
44. The Article 6 technical expert review 
pursuant to section II (Governance) shall 
review the information contained in the 
initial report of the Party pursuant to 
section VII.A (Initial report) for consistency 
with this guidance. 
NA 44. The Article 6 technical expert 
review pursuant to section II 
(Governance) shall review the 
information and methodological 
approaches contained in the initial 
report of the Party pursuant to section 
VII.A (Initial report) for consistency with 
this guidance. 
 
46. The Article 6 technical expert review 
may make recommendations to the 
participating Party on how to improve its 
consistency with this guidance, including 
how to address inconsistencies in 
quantified information. The Article 6 
technical expert review shall forward its 
reports for consideration by the technical 
expert review process under decision 
18/CMA.1. 
 46. The Article 6 technical expert 
review may make recommendations to 
the participating Party on how to 
improve its consistency with this 
guidance, including how to address 
inconsistencies in quantified 
information and to improve 
methodological approaches to 
determine additionality and calculate 
baselines. The Article 6 technical 
expert review shall forward its reports 
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Current wording in the draft 
negotiation text 
Language imposing guidance on 
additionality of ITMOs 
Language establishing 
international reporting/review of 
additionality 
Language safeguarding 
environmental integrity risks 
for consideration by the technical 
expert review process under decision 
18/CMA.1. 
47. [The Article 6 technical expert review 
may forward its report to the committee 
referred to in Article 15, paragraph 2, if the 
review reveals a [systemic issue] 
[significant inconsistencies].] [Following 
the review, the committee referred to in 
Article 15, paragraph 2, shall consider the 
review in accordance with its modalities 
and procedures. {second sentence is text 
from 8 December SBSTA text, paragraph 
35)}] 
NA NA 47. The Article 6 technical expert 
review may forward its report to the 
committee referred to in Article 15, 
paragraph 2, if the review reveals a 
systemic issue of cooperating 
approaches, including with regard to 
environmental integrity in calculating 
baselines and determining 
additionality. Following the review, the 
committee referred to in Article 15, 
paragraph 2, shall consider the review 
in accordance with its modalities and 
procedures. SBSTA shall consider the 
outcomes of the review and decide 
whether a revision of the guidance is 
necessary to address systemic issues. 
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A.2 Rules, modalities and procedures for the Article 6.4 mechanism 
Current wording in the draft 
negotiation text 
Language for a detailed 
international ruleset on 
additionality determination 
Language on guidelines for host 
country responsibilities 
Language safeguarding 
environmental integrity risks 
Decision text 
7. [Requests the SBSTA to undertake 
further work to develop the [remaining] 
provisions of the rules, modalities and 
procedures for the mechanism with regard 
to the following elements, for consideration 
and adoption by the Conference of the 
Parties serving as the meeting of the 
Parties to the Paris Agreement (CMA) at 
its third session (November 2020) as an 
integral part of the rules, modalities and 
procedures for the mechanism: 
[…] 
(c) Further responsibilities of the 
Supervisory Body and the host Parties that 
may be required for the mechanism to 
operate with a more host Party 
led/decentralized model; 
NA (c) Further responsibilities of the 
Supervisory Body and the host Parties 
that may be required for the 
mechanism to operate with a more host 
Party led/decentralized model, 
including:  
(i) the responsibilities of host countries 
to determine that the emission 
reductions expected from an activity 
exceed mitigation needed for NDC 
implementation, following guidance by 
the Supervisory Body 
(ii) the responsibilities of the 
Supervisory Body to assess 
additionality of an activity 
NA 
8. [Also requests the SBSTA to develop 
recommendations on the implementation 
of the initial provisions of the rules, 
modalities and procedures for the 
Instead of paragraph 8c:  
X. Requests the Supervisory Body to 
develop additionality tests for different 
(c) Demonstration of additionality, as 
set out in section VI.B of the annex 
(Methodologies) for activities at 
different levels of intervention, 
NA 
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Current wording in the draft 
negotiation text 
Language for a detailed 
international ruleset on 
additionality determination 
Language on guidelines for host 
country responsibilities 
Language safeguarding 
environmental integrity risks 
mechanism in relation to the following, for 
a draft decision for consideration and 
adoption by the CMA at its third session: 
[…] 
(c) Demonstration of additionality, as set 
out in section VI.B of the annex 
(Methodologies); 
types of interventions and policy 
instruments in different regional and 
economic contexts, including, but not 
limited to:  
(i) Additionality tests for regulations 
based on technology payback periods 
(ii) Additionality tests for carbon pricing 
instruments based on minimum carbon 
price thresholds 
(iii) Additionality tests for emission 
trading schemes based in the 
assessment of the stringency of 
allocation of emission permits 
including the responsibilities of the 
Supervisory Body and the coordination 
with the host country 
Rules, modalities and procedures (annex to the decision) 
46. Standardized baselines may be 
developed by the Supervisory Body at the 
request of the host Party, or may be 
developed by the host Party and approved 
by the Supervisory Body. Standardized 
baselines shall be established at the 
highest possible level of aggregation in the 
relevant sector of the host Party. 
46. Standardized baselines may be 
developed by the Supervisory Body at 
the request of the host Party, or may be 
developed by the host Party and 
approved by the Supervisory Body. 
Standardized baselines shall be 
established at the highest possible 
level of aggregation in the relevant 
sector of the host Party. Standardized 
baselines shall be regularly updated to 
NA (as long as wording in para 46 
remains the same) 
Already addressed by option 
presented left 
Additionality in Article 6 
Options for negotiations and cooperating Parties 
Perspectives Climate Group GmbH     · www.perspectives.cc       ·info@perspectives.cc    Page 35 
Current wording in the draft 
negotiation text 
Language for a detailed 
international ruleset on 
additionality determination 
Language on guidelines for host 
country responsibilities 
Language safeguarding 
environmental integrity risks 
reflect economic and technological 
shifts as well as introduced policies and 
regulations. Standardized baselines 
may be used in methodologies to 
determine mitigation interventions that 
exceeds the NDC-related mitigation of 
the host country. 
47. Each mechanism methodology shall 
specify the approach to demonstrating the 
additionality of the activity. The activity is 
additional where: 
(a) Emission reductions achieved by the 
activity are additional to any that would 
otherwise occur, [taking into account all 
relevant national policies, including 
legislation][and represent mitigation that 
exceeds any mitigation required by law, 
regulation, or legally-binding mandate, at 
the national and subnational levels]; 
(b) [Emission reductions are 
[complementary][additional] to the policies 
and measures [implemented][needed] to 
achieve the NDC of the host Party.] 
(a) Emission reductions achieved by 
the activity are additional to any that 
would otherwise occur and represent 
mitigation that exceeds any mitigation 
required by law, regulation, or legally-
binding mandate, at the national and 
subnational levels; 
(b) Emission reductions exceed those 
from policies and measures needed to 
achieve the NDC of the host Party. 
NA, current wording is sufficient NA 
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Current wording in the draft 
negotiation text 
Language for a detailed 
international ruleset on 
additionality determination 
Language on guidelines for host 
country responsibilities 
Language safeguarding 
environmental integrity risks 
48. [The Supervisory Body may waive 
additionality requirements for any least 
developed country or small island 
developing State at the request of that 
Party.] 
NA NA, current wording is sufficient NA 
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Annex B: Elements for an international work programme on additionality 2020-2021 
Timeline SBSTA /CMA UNFCCC Secretariat Article 6.4 Supervisory Body 
(and support structure) 
Cooperating 
Parties/ 
international 
piloting actors 
Until the end of SB 
52 in June 2020 
Draft of the reporting templates for 
initial and regular reporting of Parties 
under Article 6.2 guidance 
Draft text on the guidance for the 
A6TER, including guidance to assess 
additionality 
First draft of the procedures to assess 
additionality in coordination of 
Supervisory Body and host country 
By the end of March 2020: 
Technical paper 
summarizing international 
experience with additionality 
determination for project 
and programme-based 
activities 
By the end of April 2020: 
Technical paper presenting 
options for coordination 
between host country and 
Supervisory Body in the 
context of additionality 
determination (including 
flow of information) 
By the end of April 2020: 
Summary paper of 
submissions received. 
-  By the end of 
March 2020: 
Submissions on 
options to assess 
additionality in the 
context of Article 
6.2 and Article 6.4 
Between SB 52 until 
the end of COP 26 in 
November 2020 
Adoption of the reporting templates for 
initial and regular reporting of Parties 
under Article 6.2 guidance 
Adoption of the initial guidance for the 
A6TER 
Adoption of the remaining guidance on 
the process to follow in the 
determination of additionality 
By the end of September 
2020: Technical paper 
summarizing international 
experience with additionality 
determination for sectoral 
and policy – based activities 
Elaboration of the rules of 
procedure for:  
- Setting standardized 
baselines at the request of 
the host Party and regular 
updates thereof 
- Standardizing additionality 
determination through 
benchmarks and positive 
By the end of 
September 2020: 
Submissions on 
options to assess 
additionality of 
sectoral and 
policy based 
activities 
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Timeline SBSTA /CMA UNFCCC Secretariat Article 6.4 Supervisory Body 
(and support structure) 
Cooperating 
Parties/ 
international 
piloting actors 
Adoption of further rules of procedure 
of the Supervisory Body 
lists, including regular 
updates hereof 
Development of tools for 
additionality determination for 
project-and programme- based 
activities 
Between COP 26 and 
SB 54 in June 2021 
 By the end of April 2021: 
Technical paper on options 
for additionality 
determination for sectoral 
and policy activities in line 
with the long term targets of 
the PA 
Development of tools for 
additionality determination for 
sectoral and policy crediting 
activities, taking into account the 
long term targets of the PA 
By the end of 
March 2021: 
Submissions on 
implemented 
institutional 
arrangements to 
coordinate with 
the Supervisory 
Body/ the A6TER 
COP 27 in November 
2021 
Adoption of revised guidance for the 
A6TER taking into account the results 
from the process to develop 
additionality tools for sectoral and 
policy approaches under Art. 6.4 
 
Report on initial reports 
received for Article 6.2 
activities, report on first 
outcomes of A6TER 
process 
Development of tools for 
additionality determination for 
sectoral and policy crediting 
activities, taking into account the 
long term targets of the PA 
(contd.) 
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